Many DNS attacks, discussed recently are on DNS Caching Servers, DNS resolvers and there are less number of attacks on Zone Authority DNS Servers. Attacker sends DNS response packets to DNS Caching Servers before authoritative DNS Servers respond to queries sent by DNS Caching Servers, there by poisoning the cache with IP addresses for domain names of their choosing. Typically DNS Caching servers are located in company premesis and ISPs. These DNS Servers cache the responses until TTL expires. When query is raised to these caching serves, they reply immediately with response if it corresponding entry is present in its cache. If not, it sends the query to some other pre-defined uplink DNS Servers or to the authorative DNS Servers corresponding to the domain in question.
Attackers send the DNS response as if it was from uplink DNS Server or authoratative DNS Servers. Since DNS works on UDP, it is quite easy for attacker to spoof the DNS response. The difficulty in making the attack successful by attacker lies in making the response acceptable by the Caching Server. DNS Caching Servers, typically accept the response only:
- they have sent the query.
- response contains the same transaction ID as the query it had sent.
- response contains the destination port same as the source port it used to send the query.
- response contains the source port same as the destination port it used to send the query.
- response contains the source IP same as the destination IP it used to send the query.
Many DNS Caching servers implemented some additional defeneses such as:
- Additional corelation checks between Query and responses, such as checking for "Domain name" in Query section matches with Query and Answer section in the response : Many attackers are getting around this defense by sending their own queries with arbitrary domain names as part of queries and sending same in the DNS responses . By sending queries themseleves gives them even more control. That is, they need not wait for subscribers of DNS Caching Server to intiate the query, thus greatly increasing the chance of cache poison. Attackers themselves are sending the query with unknown subdomains which certainly triggers the query from the Caching server. Attacker can time their responses right after sending the query with un-resolvable and randomly created domain names. One might ask, how is Cache is getting poisoned if attackers are sending random subdomain name. At best it is kind of DoS attack. From the recent attack exploit scripts (script1 and script2), one can understand that cache poisoning is not happening with the information present in the answer section of DNS response, but using NS Resource Records (Athority section) and Additional Resource records of DNS response. Attackers are ensuring that the Domain name in Question section in both query and response is same. To understand more about this kind of attack, read 2.3 section (Name Chaining) of RFC3833.txt
- Preventing from Birthday attacks - Again this defense is being overcome by sending random domain names in each query by attackers.
- Ensuring that the NS record entry has some portion of the domain name in the Question section to make sure that arbitrary NS record is not honored: This kind of defense also is being broken by attackers. Attacker are actually creating full domain name in Question section with random string followed by the victim domain name and creating response with victim domain name in Authority section. Thereby, the defense is being bypassed by attacker. For example, if attacker wanted to serve his/her own IP addresses for www.veryimportantsite.com, then the type of queries and responses he/she sends to victim caching server look like this:
Question section is same as Query.
www.veryimportantsite.com. 6000 IN NS attacker.veryimportantsite.com.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
attacker.veryimportantsite.com. 6000 IN A 220.127.116.11
As you see above, defenses used by DNS Caching servers are not going to work. In above case, DNS Caching Server is going to use 18.104.22.168 as the Authoritative DNS Server for www.veryimporantsite.com domain name. Any queries to this caching server for domain names www.veryimportant.com and any other subdomains within it, 22.214.171.124 server is contacted. Since this server is hosted by attacker, he/she can choose to provide IP addresses for victim domain names. Basically, in this case, NS List is corrupted with some poisoned entry. Replace veryimportantsite.com with google.com, then it will have devastating effect if the DNS Caching server is one of popular ISPs' servers. Many users behind this ISP will be directed to site of attackers' choosing when they visit www.google.com or any subdomain under www.google.com.
Many people agree that the right solution is getting rid of UDP and use DNS over TCP or use DNSSEC. It is going to take time for everybody to adopt this. Until then DNS Caching Servers need to improve their randomization and security administrators install security devices to prevent the attack or get early signs of attempts.
How can security devices help?
Due to the stateful nature of network security devices, DNS response packet is not accepted by the firewall functionality of devices if 5 tuples of response don't match up with 5 tuples of DNS query. That is, DNS response packet must have its SIP equal to DIP of the query, DIP equal to SIP, SP equal to DP and DP euqal to SP. In addition, many firewall devices also check for matching transaction ID. One might think that Firewall is not adding value here since many DNS Caching servers are already doing these checks. But firewall goes one step further. It only allows DNS response from secuirty zone to which DNS query is sent. Also, it is good practice to set up the rules to allow DNS traffic as needed. Typically in Enterprises, only outbound DNS is allowed. If there are Authoritative DNS Servers in side, DNS requests are allowed only to these particular servers. This will reduce the probability of successful poisoning attacks. Let us analyze.
Assume that, a company has DNS Caching Server in its "Intranet-DMZ" zone and ISP DNS Server, ofcourse, is in untrusted (External) zone. Enterprise administartor creates a rule 'Intranet DMZ Zone' to 'External Zone' on Destination Port 53 Destination IP as ISP DNS Server with "Allow" action. Due to this rule, any DNS queries from the attacker will be dropped. So, the attacker only needs to depend on queries generated by DNS Caching Server due to genuine queries from its local users. That dramatically reduce the success of the attack. If there are internal attackers, they need to send both queries and responses.
Some firewall devices come with local DNS Caching Server (DNS Resolvers) functionality. In these cases, it should take same precautions such as randomizing the source port and transaction ID while sending DNS query to uplink DNS Servers.
I feel that security devices implementing firewall and IPS can add more defensive measures such as:
1. Many DNS resolves and Caching servers are already enhanced and donot send DNS queries on persistent sessions. That is, Each DNS query is sent with different randomized source port. Security devices can remove the session once the corresponding DNS response is received. Then count the number of DNS responses received for which there is no session entry.
As you observe from the attack scripts, for every query, large number of responses are sent by the attacker. By having some logic on counting the number of orphan responses in a particular quantum of time indicates that some attacker is trying to exploit DNS Caching Servers. Security devices can warn the administartors for further analysis.
2. Once the attack attempt is detected, security device can send one more query with the same information as in the original query and match the responses. If the content looks similar, then it can be cached and send response to the original querier. Ofcoruse, this requires some DNS resolution functionlity in the security device. Note that this functionality can also be implemented within the DNS Caching Servers too.
3. Security devices implementing NAT should not make the guessing of ID and source port easier. When NAT port is selected, it must ensure that it is random port.